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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the unemployment dynamics and the determinants of
the Beveridge curve in Greece. The economic recession alongside labor market
reforms raised the inflow rate to and decreased the outflow rate from unemployment
in the early crisis years. The gradual normalization of economic conditions and the
adoption of further structural reforms led to a decline in the inflow rate and an increase
in the outflow rate. Our results are suggestive of the presence of an inverse relationship
between unemployment and vacancies in Greece, which is driven by the post-crisis
developments.
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1 Introduction
The high and persistent unemployment rate is one of the most pressing challenges that
Greece is currently facing. The unemployment rate increased from about 8 % in 2008
to 27.5 % in 2013; it then declined slightly to 26.5 % in 2014. According to the European
Commission (2016), the unemployment rate declined to 25.1 % in 2015 and is projected
to decline further, reaching to 24.0 % in 2016. However, it still remains at unsustainably
high levels. The unemployment problem is particularly acute among young individuals,
who currently face unemployment rates close to 50 %. Moreover, more than two thirds of
the currently unemployed are without a job for a period of more than 12 months, so they
are classified as long-term unemployed.
The unemployment problem can have severe economic and social repercussions, in
terms of the marginalization of the people and groups involved in it, and in terms of
the human capital erosion, which undermines the future growth prospects of the
Greek economy. Moreover, high and persistent unemployment puts additional strains
on the social security system and the public finances in Greece.
Motivated by the above developments, this paper investigates the determinants of
unemployment dynamics in Greece. In particular, it studies the role played by inflows
and outflows in shaping recent unemployment developments. Moreover, the paper ex-
amines the relationship between unemployment and vacancies (Beveridge curve) in
Greece in order to understand whether the rise in unemployment reflects cyclical and/
or structural developments.
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According to Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), the outflow rate has been found to have
the primary role in accounting for unemployment dynamics in the USA. Shimer (2012)
has shown that since 1948, the outflow rate from unemployment has accounted for
three fourths of the fluctuation in the unemployment rate in the USA and the inflow
rate to unemployment for one fourth. Since 1987, the contribution of the outflow rate
is estimated to have reached about 90 % of the variability of the US unemployment,
while the contribution from the inflow rate is considered to be quantitatively irrelevant.
This induces Shimer to conclude that there are substantial fluctuations in the outflow
rate over the business cycle, while the inflow rate is acyclic.
Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Elsby et al. (2009) using US data and Petrogolo and
Pissarides (2008) and Smith (2011) using UK data have challenged the conclusions
of Shimer (2005, 2012) by showing that inflows to unemployment are quantitatively
relevant for unemployment dynamics. Moreover, according to Smith (2011), at
times of rising unemployment, the inflow rate is the most relevant determinant of
unemployment dynamics, while at times of declining unemployment, the outflow
rate matters the most for unemployment dynamics.
Nevertheless, Elsby et al. (2013) have shown that there is a natural partition of OECD
economies in two groups, i.e., those that have more and less flexible labor markets.
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic economies display high exit rates from unemployment, with
monthly hazard rates exceeding 20 %, whereas Continental European economies have exit
rates that are less than 10 %. Turning to inflow rates to unemployment, Anglo-Saxon and
Nordic economics have monthly inflow rates of about 1.5 %, while the inflow rates decline
to 0.5–1 % in Continental Europe. In addition, Elsby et al. (2013) show that the relative
contribution of inflow and outflow rates to unemployment fluctuations is about 20:80 in
Anglo-Saxon economies a result closer to the earlier US findings. In case of Nordic and
Continental European economies, the authors observe a 50:50 inflow/outflow split.
Bonthuis et al. (2013) study unemployment and vacancy developments in the euro
area at the aggregate and country level in order to identify whether the recent rise in
unemployment reflects cyclical or structural factors such as growing mismatches across
euro area labor markets. They find a significant outward shift in the euro area Bever-
idge curve during the Great Recession, but there is considerable heterogeneity at the
country level. For example, there is an outward shift in the Beveridge curve for Spain
and France and an inward shift for Germany. In case of Greece, there is some evidence
of an outward shift in the Beveridge curve during the recent crisis.
Following the abovementioned studies, it is very important to identify the determi-
nants of the unemployment movements in recent years in Greece. If the changes in the
inflow rate to unemployment are the most important factor behind the unemployment
fluctuation, then a pick-up in economic activity will contribute to the stabilization and
eventual decline of the unemployment rate. However, if the changes in the outflow rate
from the unemployment matter as well, then economic recovery will result in lower
unemployment only if it is associated with job creation. In addition, if there is an out-
ward shift in the Beveridge curve, then this would imply growing mismatches in the
labor market, possibly reflecting the rise in long-term unemployment. In this case, a
jobless recovery would be associated with persistently high unemployment rate. Such a
development could lead to the erosion of human capital and the deterioration of the
long-term prospects of the Greek economy.
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We use Labor Force Survey (LFS) data over the period 2001 Q1–2015 Q2 to investigate
the determinants of unemployment dynamics in Greece. Building on Smith (2011), we
find that the inflow rate to unemployment accounts for the biggest part of unemployment
variability over the sample period. However, focusing on the most recent crisis years, we
find evidence pointing to the opposite direction, i.e., that the outflow rate from unemploy-
ment is a very important determinant of the variance of unemployment. The economic
recession alongside labor market reforms raised the inflow rate to and decreased the out-
flow rate from unemployment in the early crisis years (until mid-2012). Thereafter, the
gradual normalization of economic conditions and the adoption of further structural
reforms raised the outflow rate and led to drop in the inflow rate to unemployment, con-
tributing to the slight fall in the unemployment rate in 2014–2015.
Impulse response functions based on a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) analysis
provide evidence for the negative effects of economic recession on the unemployment dy-
namics, i.e., the inflow rate to unemployment rises and the outflow rate from unemploy-
ment drops. In addition, the results of the SVAR analysis indicate that the negative effects
of economic recession on the outflow from unemployment are slightly more protracted
compared to those on the inflow rate. Cumulative dynamic multiplier functions from a
VAR model suggest that structural reforms at times of deepening recession can aggravate
the unemployment problem by raising the inflow and lowering the outflow rate, while
structural reforms undertaken at times of gradual recovery or decelerating recession can
be associated with an increase in the outflow and a decline in the inflow rate.
Building on the work of Bonthuis et al. (2013), we study unemployment and vacancy
developments in Greece from 2004 Q1 till 2015 Q2. Our results are suggestive of the
presence of an inverse relationship between unemployment and vacancies in Greece,
which is driven by the post-2008 developments. The decline in, and the sectoral realloca-
tion of, economic activity during the crisis years alongside with the adoption of less strin-
gent employment protection legislation raised the unemployment rate and led to an
outward shift in the Beveridge curve. However, the responsiveness of unemployment to va-
cancy developments has increased on account of structural reforms, which has led to an
improvement in the efficiency of the matching process. This should facilitate a more rapid
decline in unemployment when economic conditions improve and labor demand increases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the data information and
we construct the inflow rate to and the outflow rate from unemployment. In Section 3,
we present the covariance contributions of inflow and outflow rates to unemployment
variance. Section 4 discusses the unemployment and job vacancy developments in
Greece and presents econometric evidence for the presence of a negatively sloping
Beveridge curve. We then discuss in Section 5 the impact of economic recession on
unemployment dynamics by means of a SVAR analysis, while in Section 6, we present evi-
dence for the persistence of the unemployment rate following an increase in the inflow
rate. The next section presents a first assessment of the impact of structural reforms on
the inflow and outflow rates. Section 8 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Data
We use Labor Force Survey data over the period 2000 Q1–2015 Q2 in order to calcu-
late the unemployment inflows and outflows.1 We employ data regarding the responses
of participants on their current employment status (employed (E), unemployed (U),
Tagkalakis IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:13 Page 3 of 34
inactive (I)) which we then link with their responses in the recall question about their
employment status (employed, unemployed, inactive) 1 year ago.2
As a next step, we calculate quarterly flows for the three employment statuses. For
example, the number of flows from unemployment at time t − 1 to employment at time
t is shown as Ut − 1Et. Dividing this by the number of unemployed at time t − 1 (Ut − 1),
we obtain the quarterly flow rate Ut − 1Et/Ut − 1, which reflects the quarterly probability
of making the relevant transition. The quarterly flow rates are seasonally adjusted
(ARIMA X12). In a similar manner, we construct the remaining flow rates, e.g.,
Εt − 1Ut/Et − 1 and Ut − 1Ιt/Ut − 1.
Building on Petrogolo and Pissarides (2008) and Smith (2011), we calculate the in-
stantaneous transition rates. For example, λt_UE ( λtUE ¼  ln 1 Ut  1EtUt  1

)) represents
the instantaneous transition rate from unemployment to employment and is called job
finding rate; λt_EU is transition rate from employment to unemployment and is called
job separation rate. In order to calculate the total inflow rate to unemployment (st), we
take into account both the job separation rate (λt_EU) and the transition rate from em-
ployment (Ε) to inactivity (I) and the transition rate from inactivity (I) to unemploy-
ment (U). Hence,
st ¼ λt EU þ λt EI  λt IU
λt IU þ λt IEð Þ ð1Þ
where the second term in Eq. (1) reflects the transition Ε→ Ι→U. Analogously, the
total outflow rate from unemployment (ft) is calculated as the sum of the job finding
rate (λt_UE) and the transition rate from unemployment to employment via inactivity.
Therefore,
f t ¼ λt UE þ
λt UI  λt IE
λt IU þ λt IEð Þ ð2Þ
where the second part of Eq. (2) reflects the transition U→ Ι→ E.
Figure 1 plots estimates of the total inflow and outflow rates, as well as the un-
employment rate and the real GDP growth rate. The total inflow rate and the total out-
flow rate were on average at about 35 and 3 %, respectively, until the end of 2008.
However, after 2009–2010, driven by the deteriorating economic conditions, the total
outflow rate and the total inflow rate followed distinct paths, i.e., decreasing and in-
creasing, respectively. This trend continued until about 2012 Q2, when the outflow and
inflow rates reached their minimum and maximum values, respectively, over the sam-
ple period, i.e., 10 % for the outflow rate and 8 % for the inflow rate. This period was
characterized by high political polarization, the rise of uncertainty, and double national
elections in May and June 2012.
Subsequently, both inflow and outflow rates improved in line with the bottoming out
of recession and the gradually improving economic conditions, despite the fact that the
unemployment rate kept rising until it reached a pick in 2013 Q3. Consequently, the
inflow rate stood at about 5 % and the outflow rate at about 17 % in 2015 Q2, i.e., the
last available observation.
The changes in the inflow and outflow rates (Fig. 1) reflect both cyclical and struc-
tural developments. The rapidly deteriorating economic conditions until the end 2011
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exerted a negative effect on labor market developments, lowering the outflow rate from
and raising the inflow rate to unemployment.3 Following the double elections in 2012
Q2, uncertainty receded and economic conditions were normalized. As a consequence,
both inflow and outflow rates improved.
However, during the period under examination, various structural reforms were im-
plemented aiming at improving the flexibility of the labor market. The progress
achieved is reflected in the reduction of employment protection legislation (EPL) index
of the OECD which is shown in Fig. 2. The relaxation of the restriction in firing and
hiring in late 2010–early 2011 (regarding the notice period for dismissal, the severance
payments, etc.) allowed firms to cut labor costs by laying-off workers, without incurring
high dismissal costs. This allowed many firms to continue stay afloat during bad eco-
nomic times. However, it accelerated the increase in the inflow rate to unemployment
(s), while the decline in employment growth and the posted job vacancies on account
of the recession contributed to the fall of the outflow rate from unemployment (f ). As
a consequence, the unemployment rate increased from about 12.6 % in 2010 Q3 to
about 18 % 1 year later and skyrocketed to about 25 % 2 years later.
Fig. 2 Employment protection legislation (EPL)—reflecting flexibility in individual and collective dismissals.
Note: source OECD. Lower values reflect a more flexible labor market
Fig. 1 Inflow rate to unemployment, outflow rate from unemployment, unemployment rate, real GDP growth
rate (in %). Source: Labor Force Survey, El.Stat; author’s calculations
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The structural reforms that were initiated as part of the second Economic Adjust-
ment Programme for Greece in 2012, i.e., the reduction in social security contributions
in November 2012 and in July 2014, the activation of various training and internship
labor market programs, the changes in the determination of minimum wages (involving
a wage reduction of 22 % for workers aged above 25 and a 32 % reduction for workers
below 25 years of age), the primacy given in firm level agreements which could set
wages below those in the national collective agreement, etc., facilitated the reduction in
nominal wages. These developments allowed firms to reduce labor costs through nom-
inal wage cuts rather than labor shedding, which, in turn, led to decline in the inflow
rate to unemployment. Furthermore, the new framework that was put in place, which
allowed employers to hire new employees benefiting both from the reduction in nom-
inal wages and the less regulated labor market, had a positive effect on labor demand.
As a consequence, the job vacancy rate, after reaching its minimum value in 2013 Q2,
started to rise thereafter, leading to an increase in the outflow rate from unemployment.
The decline in the inflow rate to and the increase in the outflow rate from unemployment
led to a small drop in the unemployment rate, i.e., to 26.5 % in 2014 from its peak value
of 27.5 % in 2013.
Turning to the remaining transition rates (Figs. 3 and 4), we observe that the main
determinants of the total inflow rate (s) to and the total outflow rate (f ) from un-
employment are the job separation (λEU) and the job finding rates (λUE), respectively.
Nevertheless, from 2009 to 2010 onwards, the relevance of the transition from employ-
ment to unemployment via inactivity (Ε→ Ι→U) for the determination of the total
inflow rate (s) has increased. On the contrary, the transition from unemployment to
employment via inactivity (U→ Ι→ E) has a smaller effect on the total outflow rate
from unemployment (f ).
Indeed, the transition rates from inactivity to unemployment (λIU) and from inactivity
to employment (λIE) hovered around 2 % before the crisis period; however, thereafter,
they followed a diverse path with λIU increasing to about 3 % and λIE declining to about
1 % (Fig. 4). These movements reflect the fact that on account of the recent crisis, indi-
viduals that were previously inactive were obliged (possibly because of unemployment
Fig. 3 Total inflow and outflow rates and job separation and finding rates (in %). Source: Labor Force
Survey, El.Stat; author’s calculations
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in family members, wage cuts, etc.) to enter the labor market and seek employ-
ment and consequently to be recorded as unemployed. In addition, the evolution
of the transition rate from unemployment to inactivity (λUI) indicates that there is
limited discourage worker effect in the course of the recent crisis. However, there
is a slight uptick in the relevant transition rate (λUI) from 2014 Q1 until the end
of the sample.
3 Covariance contributions to unemployment variance
Following the work of Smith (2011), we calculate the covariance (βs and βf ) contribu-
tion of the inflow and outflow rate to the variance of steady state unemployment utss :
ut ss ¼ stst þ f tð Þ
ð3Þ
Changes in the inflow rate (s) explain 58 % of movements in steady state unemploy-
ment (Table 1). Changes in the job separation rate (λt_ΕU) account for about 39 % of
the variation in steady state unemployment. The role of the outflow rate (f ) is lower,
i.e., it accounts for about 41 % of steady state unemployment variability with the biggest
effect reflecting the job finding rate (λt_UE) which explains 35 % of the unemployment
variability.
These findings resemble the ones reported by Smith (2011) for the UK (for the period
1988–2008), Hairault et al. (2015) for France (for the period 1990–2002), and Daouli
Fig. 4 Transition rates into and out of inactivity (in %). Source: Labor Force Survey, El.Stat; author’s calculations
Table 1 Covariance contributions to steady state unemployment variance
β Transition rate
βs Inflow rate to unemployment 0.58
βf Outflow rate from unemployment 0.41
βEU Job separation rate 0.39
βUE Job finding rate 0.35
βEIU Inflow via inactivity 0.19
βUIE Outflow via inactivity 0.06
Notes: The sum of βs (= βEU + βEIU) and βf (= βUE+ βUIE) do not add up to one due to the approximation error. Source:
LFS, 2001 Q1 -2015 Q2
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et al. (2015) for Greece (for the period 1998–2013) and Bank of Greece (2015). Hence,
contrary to the findings of Shimer (2005, 2012) for the USA, changes in the inflow rate
do explain substantial part of unemployment dynamics.4
Next, we repeat the analysis that underlies the findings report in Table 1, but this
time, we compute rolling 4-year betas (i.e., βs, βf, etc.); Fig. 5 plots the findings. From
the start of the period under investigation until the end of 2012, the inflow rate (s) has
the primary role in explaining the variability in steady state unemployment. However,
from the period 2009 Q2 to 2013 Q1 onwards, the outflow rate (f ) accounts for the big-
gest part of the variability in steady state unemployment. It should be recalled that
from 2013 onwards, the recession bottomed out and the structural reforms that were
previously implemented started to bear fruit in terms of lower labor costs and more
flexible labor markets. These developments improved labor prospects, despite the fact
that the unemployment rate continued its upward path until 2013 Q3.5
Overall, we find evidence that both the inflow and outflow rate play an important role
in changing unemployment rates. At times of rising unemployment, the inflow rate to
unemployment (job separation) plays the most important role, while the outflow from
unemployment (job finding) plays the most important role at times of declining
unemployment. Flexible labor relations are expected to contributed positively to both
inflow and outflow rates. The results suggest that economic recovery is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for the reduction of the very high unemployment rate. Economic
recovery should go hand-in-hand with job creation to address the unemployment persist-
ence problem.
4 The Beveridge curve in Greece
The importance of the job finding rate for the reduction of the unemployment rate dis-
cussed in the previous section is also related to the evolution of the job vacancy rate,
which reflects labor demand by the business sector.6 Figure 6 plots the job vacancy rate
Fig. 5 Rolling 4-year estimations of βs and βf and rolling 4-year average of the unemployment rate (in %).
Notes: Rolling 4-year estimations of βs, βf, and rolling 4-year average the unemployment rate. The horizontal
axis shows each 4-year period. Source: LFS, El.Stat, author’s calculations
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and the unemployment rate for the period 2004 Q4–2015 Q2. The rise in unemploy-
ment rate since 2009 went hand-in-hand with the decline in the job vacancy rate
(which started already in late 2006). The job vacancy rate reached a trough in 2013 Q2.
Subsequently, it trended upwards in line with the gradual decline in unemployment.
Nevertheless, it still remains at levels that are below those recorded in 2005–2010.7
The Beveridge curve (see Fig. 7) reflects both the cyclical conditions and the effi-
ciency of the labor market to match unemployed workers and available vacancies. The
Fig. 6 Job vacancy rate and unemployment rate (in %). Note: Job vacancy rate = posted vacancies/(posted
vacancies + occupied posts), unemployment rate, age 15–74. To control for seasonality, the values reported
for both the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are averages over four quarters, i.e., the
observation for 2004 Q4 is the average of 2004 Q1–2004 Q4. Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations
Fig. 7 The Beveridge curve 2004 Q4–2015 Q2 (in %). Note: To control for seasonality, the values reported
for both the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are averages over four quarters, i.e., the
observation for 2004 Q4 is the average of 2004 Q1–2004 Q4. Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations
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Beveridge curve has the usual downward slopping trend (Fig. 7). However, the picture
that emerges from the start of the sample in 2004 till late 2009 is rather mixed. This is
also reflected in the upward slopping Beveridge curve in Fig. 8 covering the period
2004 Q4–2009 Q3. The positive slope is primarily due to the 2004–2005 observations.
During that time, the unemployment rate remained close to 10 % despite the very high
job vacancy rates. This development indicates the presence of structural unemploy-
ment, i.e., a significant mismatch between the attributes of the unemployed and the
posted vacancies, as well as significant restrictions in the labor market, which reduce
competition between workers for the available jobs. On the other hand, given that the
vacancy data collection for Greece (and the EU in general) started in 2004, it is likely
that the first observations might contain some errors.
If we drop the first three observation of the first sub-sample and consider the period
2005 Q4–2009 Q3, the slope of the Beveridge curve becomes negative (see Fig. 9). A
closer examination of the period 2006–2008 reveals a decline in unemployment from
about 9.5–10 % to about 8–8.5 %, although the job vacancy rate remains steady at
about 1.5–2 %. This is suggestive of a slight inward shift of the Beveridge curve.
From late 2009 onwards, on account of the deteriorating economic conditions, the
unemployment and the job vacancy rates followed increasing and decreasing paths, re-
spectively. Two changes are discernible in the Beveridge curve over the recent crisis
years: First, there is an outward shift in the Beveridge curve—a job vacancy rate of
1.1 % corresponds to a higher unemployment rate than before (i.e., 13–14 % compared
to 10 % in 2005 Q4—see Fig. 7). Second, the negative slope of the Beveridge curve has
been reduced—this is evident from the slope of the trend line in Fig. 10 compared to
the one in Fig. 7. As depicted in Fig. 10, the deterioration of economic conditions leads
to an increase in unemployment and a decline in the vacancy rate, i.e., a movement
along the Beveridge curve.
The bottoming out of recession and the gradual decline in the unemployment from
2014 onwards is associated with a marginal pick-up in the job vacancy rate. Neverthe-
less, a potentially disturbing picture emerges, i.e., a slight outward shift in the Beveridge
Fig. 8 The Beveridge curve 2004 Q4–2009 Q3 (in %). Note: To control for seasonality, the values reported
for both the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are averages over four quarters. Source: Eurostat,
author’s calculations
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curve despite the small decline in unemployment (vis-à-vis its high levels recorded in
2013). A job vacancy rate of 0.9 % is currently associated with an unemployment rate
that is around 25–26 % compared to 17 % at the end of 2011.
Overall, despite the labor market reforms that were implemented since 2010 aiming
at enhancing the matching efficiency of the Greek labor market, the large structural
changes and the sectoral reallocation of economic activity on account of the recent cri-
sis have created increased (skill, sectoral, locational) mismatches between unemployed
and posted vacancies leading to very high structural unemployment. Based on LFS data,
Fig. 9 The Beveridge curve 2005 Q4–2009 Q3 (in %). Note: To control for seasonality, the values reported
for both the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are averages over four quarters. Source: Eurostat,
author’s calculations
Fig. 10 The Beveridge curve 2009 Q4–2015 Q2 (in %). Note: To control for seasonality the values reported
for both the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are averages over four quarters. Source: Eurostat,
author’s calculations
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more than two thirds of the currently unemployed are in a state of unemployment for
a period of more than 12 months, thus being classified as long-term unemployed.
On the other hand, it should be taken into account that at times, job vacancies tend
to move quicker than unemployment. This can lead to a sudden drop (or jump) in va-
cancies while unemployment doesn’t react (yet). This does not necessarily mean that
the Beveridge curve has shifted in or out, these issues will be discussed in more detail
in the next section.
4.1 Econometric analysis
Building on the work of Bonthuis et al. (2013) and the studies cited therein, we investigate
the relationship between the unemployment rate and the job vacancy rate. We rely on sea-
sonally adjusted data covering the period 2004 Q1–2015 Q2 in order to establish statistical
significance for the findings suggested by the visual inspection of Fig. 7, in particular, the
effect of the recent crisis and the role of structural reforms.8 The benchmark model is:9
Ut ¼ αþ β1  Ut − 1 þ β2  Vt þ β3  Vt2 þ εt ð4Þ
where Ut is the unemployment rate, the lagged unemployment rate controls for un-
employment persistence,10 Vt is the job vacancy rate, and the quadratic term Vt
2 reflects
the convexity of the Beveridge curve. As pointed by Bonthuis et al. (2013), it captures
non-linearities in the Beveridge curve, i.e., a smaller unemployment rate reaction when
the job vacancy rate are very high (as in the early years of our sample), but higher reac-
tion when vacancies are low (as in the latter years of our sample). We consider several
variants of Eq. (4). For example, we estimate:
Ut ¼ αþ β1  Ut − 1 þ β2  Vt þ β3  Vt2 þ β4  CRISISt þ β5  EPLt þ εt ð5Þ
CRISIS is a dummy variable capturing the impact of the negative real GDP growth in
the Greek economy, and it would imply an outward shift in the Beveridge curve. It
takes a value of 1 at times of negative annual real GDP growth rate (yt − yt − 4 < 0, where
yt is the quarterly real GDP) and 0 otherwise. The EPL index of the OECD (see Fig. 2)
measures the strictness of employment protection legislation and accounts for the im-
pact of the labor market legislative changes on the position of the Beveridge curve.11
Alternatively, for the sake of better understanding the results, we also employ the RE-
FORMS index which reflects the structural labor market reforms that were undertaken
in recent years. This index is simply the inverse of the EPL index (1/EPL). Therefore,
higher values of REFORMS are interpreted as establishment move towards a more flex-
ible labor market.
We also consider interaction terms between the job vacancy rate, the CRISIS dummy
(CRISISt*Vt), and the EPL index (EPLt*Vt). We estimate each interaction term at a time
in Eqs. (6) and (7):
Ut ¼ αþ β1  Ut − 1 þ β2  Vt þ β3  Vt2 þ β4  CRISISt þ β5  EPLt þ β6
 CRISISt  V t þ εt ð6Þ
Ut ¼ αþ β1  Ut − 1 þ β2  Vt þ β3  Vt2 þ β4  CRISISt þ β5  EPLt þ þ β6
 EPLt  V t þ εt ð7Þ
The interaction term (CRISISt*Vt) captures changes in the slope of the Beveridge
curve, i.e., changes in the efficiency of the matching process that are attributed to the
Tagkalakis IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:13 Page 12 of 34
crisis. In Eq. (6), we calculate the “Effect of the job vacancy rate if CRISIS = 1” as the
sum of β2 + β6.
The interaction term (EPLt*Vt) captures changes in the slope of the Beveridge curve,
i.e., changes in the efficiency of the matching process, that are attributed to changes in
labor market regulation. For example, a more flexible labor market should be expected
to increase the responsiveness of unemployment to vacancy developments. In Eq. (7),
we calculate the “Effect of the job vacancy rate conditional on EPL” as the sum of
β2 + β6*EPLt, (where EPL can be evaluate at its sample average value).
In Eq. (8), we incorporate a full set of interaction terms that controls both for the
interaction of job vacancy rate with the CRISIS dummy variable and the EPL index, as
well as for the joint interaction between CRISIS, EPL, and job vacancy rate:
Ut ¼ αþ β1  Ut − 1 þ β2  V t þ β3  V t2 þ β4  CRISISt þ β5  EPLt þ β6  CRISISt  V t
þ β7  EPLt  V t þ β8  CRISIS  EPL  V t þ β9  CRISIS  EPLt þ εt
ð8Þ
Following European Commission (2015), we calculate the following: (1) the “Effect of
the job vacancy rate conditional on EPL if CRISIS = 1” as the sum of (β2 + β6) +
(β7 + β8)*EPLt, and (2) the “Effect of the job vacancy rate conditional on EPL if
CRISIS = 0” as the sum of β2 + β7*EPLt (where EPL can be evaluate at its sample
average value).
The main set of results is reported in Table 2. The coefficient on the lagged un-
employment rate is large and highly significant, indicating considerable unemployment
persistence. Moreover, the coefficient is strictly below 1 at all times (see columns 1–6)
contrary to the findings of Bonthuis et al. (2013) who find a coefficient above 1
(suggesting a not well-defined Beveridge curve for Greece). Starting from the baseline
specification of Eq. (4), we find that the job vacancy rate, as expected, has a negative
coefficient, which is an evidence for the inverse relationship between the unemploy-
ment rate and the job vacancy rate (see column 1, Table 2). The squared job vacancy
rate has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (see column 1), suggesting that
the convexity condition of the Beveridge curve holds. There is a small unemployment
response when labor demand is strong and job vacancies are high (the period
2004–2005) and a stronger unemployment response when job vacancies are low
(the recent crisis years). However, both the size and the statistical significance of
the coefficient of the squared job vacancy rate decline when we take into account
other factors such the CRISIS dummy variable and the EPL index and their inter-
actions with the job vacancy rate (see columns 2–6).
The impact of the CRISIS dummy variable is both positive and statistically significant
(see columns 2–4, Table 2), implying an outward shift of the Beveridge curve in times
of economic recession. The interaction term CRISIS*V is negative and statistically
significant (see column 3). At the same time, the coefficient of the job vacancy rate
remains negative but it is not statistically significant. Consequently, the “effect of the
job vacancy rate if CRISIS = 1” is negative (−1.05) and highly statistically significant in
column 4. This implies an increase in the responsiveness of the unemployment to
vacancy developments over the recent crisis. Hence, the inverse relationship between
unemployment and vacancies, which underlies the Beveridge curve, is primarily due to
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Table 2 Beveridge curve estimations (whole sample 2004 Q1–2015 Q2)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable Unemployment rate
Unemployment ratet − 1 0.967 (39.94)*** 0.894 (25.58)*** 0.977 (49.28)*** 0.971 (54.30)*** 0.853 (27.40)*** 0.885 (23.13)***
Job vacancy ratet −1.342 (−2.24)** −0.586 (−1.31) −0.657 (−1.36) −0.095 (−0.22) −6.620 (−2.74)*** −0.835 (−0.45)
Job vacancy ratet
2 19.878 (2.03)** 10.470 (1.41) 11.037 (1.38) 2.095 (0.31) 12.139 (1.24) 0.896 (0.14)
CRISISt 0.007 (3.91)*** 0.008 (4.11)*** 0.019 (4.07)*** 0.015 (0.44)
EPLt −0.022 (−2.54)** −0.049 (−2.74)*** −0.028 (−2.19)**
Job vacancy rate*CRISISt −0.954 (−2.83)*** −1.807 (−0.58)
Job vacancy rate*EPLt 2.086 (2.00)* 0.308 (0.41)
CRISIS*EPLt 0.002 (0.11)
Job vacancy rate*CRISIS*EPL 0.305 (0.25)
Constant term 0.022 (2.31)** 0.076 (2.87)*** 0.008 (1.15) 0.003 (0.49) 0.163 (3.52)*** 0.086 (0.47)
Effect of job vacancy if CRISIS = 1 −1.050532 (−2.77)***
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on EPL
−4.534 (−3.25)***
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on EPL if CRISIS = 1
−2.029 (−1.38)
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on
EPL if CRISIS = 0
−0.528 (−0.47)
Obs 46 46 46 46 46 46
F-test (p value) F(3, 42) = 1371.26 (0.000) F(5, 40) = 1447.58 (0.0000) F(4, 41) = 1431.98 (0.000) F(5, 40) = 1472.98(0.0000) F(5, 40) = 1322.13 (0.0000) F(9, 36) = 2090.63 (0.0000)
R2 0.9921 0.9954 0.9944 0.9951 0.9942 0.9960
Note: Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively (t-statistics in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy if
CRISIS = 1 is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + job vacancy rate*CRISIS (z-statistic in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy conditional on EPL is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy
rate*EPL (z-statistics in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy conditional on EPL if CRISIS = 1 is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy rate*EPL + job vacancy rate*CRISIS + job vacancy rate*CRISIS*EPL












the more recent economic developments. The visual inspection of Figs. 7–10 has
already pointed to this conclusion.12
The index EPL has a negative and statistical significant coefficient (see columns 2, 5–6),
suggesting that structural reforms (a lower EPL value) induce an outward shift of the
Beveridge curve, i.e., they raise unemployment for the same level of job vacancies.
Similarly, as reported in column 1 of Table 3, the REFORMS index has a positive and sta-
tistically significant coefficient, implying that more flexible labor markets are associated
with higher unemployment rate.
The interaction term EPL*V has a positive coefficient estimate (column 4, Table 2), while
the coefficient estimate of the job vacancy rate is negative and statistically significant (col-
umn 4, Table 2). As a consequence, the “effect of the job vacancy rate conditional on EPL”
in column 4 is negative (−4.534) and statistically significant. This is suggestive of an increase
in the responsiveness of unemployment to vacancy developments on account of structural
reforms that reduce the EPL index, i.e., an improvement in the efficiency of the matching
process. Similarly, as reported in column 2 of Table 3, the “effect of the job vacancy rate
conditional on REFORMS” is negative (−8.952) and statistically significant—i.e., labor mar-
ket reforms raise the responsiveness of unemployment to vacancy developments.
In column 6 (Table 2), we present the findings that correspond to Eq. (8), where we
control for the joint interaction between the CRISIS dummy variable, the EPL index,
Table 3 Beveridge curve estimations with REFORM variable (whole sample 2004 Q1–2015 Q2)
1 2 3
Dependent variable Unemployment rate
Unemployment ratet − 1 0.894 (24.98)*** 0.851 (26.21)*** 0.884 (22.48)***
Job vacancy ratet −0.600 (−1.34) 3.724 (1.31) 0.664 (0.35)
Job vacancy ratet
2 10.690 (1.43) 12.499 (1.27) 0.959 (0.14)
CRISISt 0.007 (3.93)*** 0.024 (0.60)
REFORMSt 0.130 (2.50)** 0.299 (2.67)*** 0.164 (2.17)**
Job vacancy rate*CRISISt −0.361 (−0.12)





Constant term −0.031 (−1.72)* −0.082 (−1.82)* −0.049 (−1.72)
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on REFORMS
−8.952 (−2.45)**
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on REFORMS if CRISIS = 1
−3.210 (−0.90)
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on REFORMS if CRISIS = 0
−1.131 (−0.43)
Obs 46 46 46
F-test (p value) F(5, 40) = 1405.20 (0.000) F(5, 40) = 1281.60 (0.000) F(9, 36) = 2092.16 (0.000)
R2 0.9953 0.9941 0.9959
Note: Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure. ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively (t-statistics in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy conditional on REFORM
is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy rate*REFORM (z-statistics in parenthesis). The effect
of job vacancy conditional on REFORM if CRISIS = 1 is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy
rate*REFORM + job vacancy rate*CRISIS + job vacancy rate*CRISIS*REFORM (z-statistics in parenthesis). The effect of
job vacancy conditional on REFORM if CRISIS = 0 is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy
rate*REFORM (z-statistics in parenthesis)
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and the job vacancy rate. The coefficient estimates in this specification are in most
cases not statistically significant. However, we can see that the “effect of the job vacancy
rate conditional on EPL if CRISIS = 0” is negative having a value of −0.528, while the
“effect of the job vacancy rate conditional on EPL if CRISIS = 1” is also negative but
more sizeable, i.e., −2.029.
A similar picture emerges if we look the estimates in column 3 of Table 3, the coefficient
of the job vacancy rate is positive (0.664) but not statistically significant, the “effect of the
job vacancy rate conditional on REFORMS if CRISIS = 0” is negative having a value
of −1.131, while the “effect of the job vacancy rate conditional on REFORMS if
CRISIS = 1” is negative but more sizeable, i.e., −3.210. However, the coefficient estimates
are not particularly significant.
Qualitatively, these findings suggest that it is primarily the effect of the CRISIS that
induces a greater responsiveness of the unemployment to vacancy developments rela-
tive to a decline in the EPL or the increase in the REFORMS index. Nevertheless, a
lower EPL or a higher value of the REFORMS index is in fact reducing the responsiveness
of unemployment to vacancy developments. Alternatively put, it is structural reforms at
times of economic crisis that induce the greater responsiveness of unemployment to
vacancy developments rather than reforms at regular economic times.
As a robustness check in Table 4, we have considered a smaller sample, i.e., 2005
Q4–2015 Q2. Given that vacancy data collection for Greece (and the EU in general)
started in early 2004, we drop the first few observations that are likely to be liable to
data problems. The findings reported in Table 4 are qualitatively similar to those
reported before.
Overall, structural reforms, which increase the flexibility of the labor market, were
implemented in a recessionary context, aggravating the unemployment problem. At the
same time, there is some preliminary evidence that reforms also improved the effi-
ciency of the matching process. This implies a more pronounced unemployment
response at times of increased labor demand when more job vacancies are posted.
Concluding, the results presented in Tables 2–4 correspond to the analysis of
Bonthuis et al. (2013) and verify the presence of an inverse relationship between
unemployment and vacancies in Greece. This inverse relationship primarily reflects
developments after 2008, the time that Greece dipped into recession. The decline
in economic activity alongside with a more flexible labor market contributed to an
increase in unemployment, i.e., an outward shift in the Beveridge curve. Nevertheless,
there is evidence suggesting that the responsiveness of unemployment to vacancy devel-
opments has increased on account of structural reforms, which can lead to an improve-
ment of the matching process and a more rapid reduction in the unemployment rate
when the job vacancy rate accelerates.
5 The effect of an economic activity decline on job finding, separation, and
vacancy rates: a structural VAR approach
The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 that examine the evolution of the inflow rate to and
outflow rate from unemployment in recent years is unconditional; various factors could
have affected these transition rates. In this section, building on the work of Hairault et
al. (2015) and using seasonally adjusted (ARIMA X12) data from 2005 Q4 till 2015 Q2,
we investigate econometrically the effect on an exogenous shock in economic activity
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Table 4 Beveridge curve estimations (small sample 2005 Q4–2015 Q2)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable Unemployment rate
Unemployment ratet − 1 0.938 (37.47)*** 0.879 (30.91)*** 0.956 (43.09)*** 0.959 (42.50)*** 0.849 (29.93)*** 0.882 (22.71)***
Job vacancy ratet −3.332 (−3.38)*** −2.325 (−3.68)*** −2.497 (−3.06)*** −1.435 (−1.36) −3.351 (−0.93) 1.392 (0.54)
Job vacancy ratet
2 75.063 92.90*** 60.712 (3.32)*** 63.647 (2.90)*** 36.123 (1.34) 66.531 (1.23) 46.855 (1.23)
CRISISt 0.007 (3.28)*** 0.008 (3.23)*** 0.015 (2.44)** 0.031 (0.82)
EPLt −0.021 (−2.87)*** −0.027 (−1.01) −0.011 (−0.49)
Job vacancy rate*CRISISt −0.577 (−1.56) −2.899 (−0.93)
Job vacancy rate*EPLt 0.166 (0.08) −1.122 (−0.82)
CRISIS*EPLt −0.007 (−0.39)
Job vacancy rate*CRISIS*EPL 0.864 (0.70)
Constant term 0.041 (3.61)*** 0.089 (4.06) 0.026 (2.53) 0.016 (1.32) 0.118 (2.02)** 0.055 (1.09)
Effect of job vacancy if CRISIS = 1 −2.012 (−2.36)**
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on EPL
−3.185 (−1.87)*
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on EPL if CRISIS = 1
−1.765 (−1.18)
Effect of job vacancy conditional
on EPL if CRISIS = 0
0.270 (0.20)
Obs 39 39 39 39 39 39
F-test (p value) F(3, 35) = 1971.88 (0.000) F(5, 33) = 2968.04 (0.0000) F(4, 34) = 2588.66 (0.0000) F(5, 33) = 3014.69 (0.000) F(5, 33) = 1606.35 (0.0000) F(9, 29) = 3776.35 (0.000)
R2 0.9936 0.9962 0.9952 0.9954 0.9950 0.9964
Note: Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively (t-statistics in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy if
CRISIS = 1 is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + job vacancy rate*CRISIS (z-statistic in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy conditional on EPL is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy
rate*EPL (z-statistics in parenthesis). The effect of job vacancy conditional on EPL if CRISIS = 1 is the non-linear combination: Job vacancy rate + Job vacancy rate*EPL + job vacancy rate*CRISIS + job vacancy rate*CRISI-












on the transition rate into and out of unemployment and the job vacancy rate.13 We
control for the policy changes undertaken in recent years by incorporating the shift
dummy variable EAP taking values 1 from 2010 Q2 onwards and zero otherwise; EAP
stands for Economic Adjustment Programme.14
We consider a structural VAR specification that includes an intercept and where the
lag length is set to 2.15 The SVAR we estimate is of the form:
Xt ¼ A1  Xt − 1 þ Ct þ ut ð9Þ
where Xt = [Dy, s, f, v] is the vector of endogenous variables, Dy stands for real GDP
growth rate (Dy = yt − yt − 4), s stands for the inflow rate to unemployment, f stands for
the outflow rate from unemployment, and v stands for job vacancy rate. Ct contains the
deterministic terms. In order to conduct an impulse response function analysis, we
need to identify the structural shock to Dy by imposing on the matrices A and B
that determine the mapping from the VAR innovations u to the structural shocks ε
(Aut = Bεt) the following restrictions (Cholesky decomposition):
1 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0
a31 a32 1 0










β11 0 0 0
0 β22 0 0
0 0 β33 0










These restrictions assume that a percentage change in real GDP growth is not con-
temporaneously affected by changes in s, f, or v and allows us to examine the impulse
responses of these three variables following a well-identified exogenous shock on real
GDP. Results are presented in Fig. 11a–d. The solid black line represents the response
of the variable of interest to the exogenous negative shock on output growth; the two
round-dotted black lines are the 68 % confidence bands.16 Following a negative output
growth shock, the economic downturn lasts for about six quarters and leads to a de-
cline in the job vacancy rate for about nine quarters. The inflow rate to unemployment
(s) rises and remains positive for about nine quarters. There is a drop in the outflow
rate from unemployment (f ) which lasts for about 10 quarters. The increase in the in-
flow rate and the decline in the outflow rate lead to higher unemployment.
The abovementioned developments imply a downward movement along the Beveridge
curve, i.e., as economic conditions deteriorate, job vacancies drop and unemployment
rises. Note that the response of the outflow rate is slightly more protracted compared to
the one of the inflow rate. Therefore, following a negative economic activity shock, the
unemployment rate rises and will continue rising for about one quarter more after the ter-
mination of the flows from employment to unemployment.
Building on the impulse responses of the inflow and the outflow rates displayed in
Fig. 11a, b and the sample averages of the transition rates s and f, we can compute the
implied response of the unemployment rate to the negative economic activity shock.
The implied unemployment response is calculated as follows:
u t þ 1ð Þ ¼ u tð Þ þ 1−u tð Þ
   s tð Þ−u tð Þ  f tð Þ ð11Þ
where the starting value is u(t) = 13.70 %, i.e., it is the steady state unemployment rate
(uss = s/(s + f )) that is calculated based on the whole sample averages for s and f (s =
4.34 % and f = 27.31 %). Hence, we assume that the economy is initially at the steady
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state and moves out of the steady state following the economic activity shock that im-
pacts on the inflow (s) and outflow (f ) rates.17 The values of s and f that are used in Eq.
(11) are continuously updated (starting from the initial values s = 4.34 % and f =
27.31 %) based on the impulse response functions of the inflow (dst/dy) and outflow
(dft/dy) rates (for t = 0,1…20 quarters).
For example, s(t = 0) = 4.34 % + ds(t = 0)/dy, s(t = 1) = s(t = 0) + ds(t = 1)/dy,…,s(t = 20) = s(t = 19) +
ds(t = 20)/dy and f(t = 0) = 27.31 % + df(t = 0)/dy, f(t = 1) = f(t = 0) + df(t = 1)/dy,…,f(t = 20) = f(t = 19) +
df(t = 20)/dy. The implied responses of the inflow (s) and outflow (f) rates to an economic
activity shock for quarters t = 0, 1,….20 are depicted in Fig. 12. Iterating Eq. (11) forward,
we obtain the implied unemployment rate following an economic activity shock
(see Fig. 13).
In order to assess the impact of the inflow rate (s) on the evolution of unemployment
rate, we repeat the same exercise as above (we iterate Eq. (11) forward) holding fixed
the outflow rate (f ) at the initial (sample average) value f = 27.31 %. Similarly, to assess
the impact of outflow rate (f ) on the unemployment rate, we iterate Eq. (11) forward
holding fixed the inflow rate (s) at its initial (sample average) value s = 4.34 %.
Fig. 11 Impulse responses following a negative economic activity shock (in p.p.). a Inflow rate (s) to
unemployment. b Outflow rate (f) from unemployment. c Job vacancy rate. d Real GDP growth rate. Notes:
The solid black line represents the response of the variable of interest to the exogenous negative shock on
output growth; the two round-dotted black lines are the 68 % confidence bands. The exogenous decline in
output growth is modeled to be 1 percentage point. Standard errors have been calculated by bootstrapping
the residuals (1000 replications were performed)
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Interestingly, the increase in unemployment is primarily due to the increase in the in-
flow rate (s) as can be seen from the evolution of the unemployment rate when f is held
fixed at its initial value (see Fig. 13). Figure 14a presents the implied unemployment
rate response which is positive for about 12 quarters, following an economic activity
shock and the contributions of the inflow (s) and outflow (f ) rates.18
As a robustness check, we repeat the above exercise, but we now consider two add-
itional scenarios for the staring values s, f, and u: (1) we use the average values over the
period 2005 Q4–2010 Q1, i.e., s = 2.14 % and f = 28.71 % which imply uss = s/(s + f ) =
6.95 %, and (2) the average values from 2010 Q2 till 2015 Q2, i.e., s = 4.55 % and f =
12.66 %, which imply uss = s/(s + f ) = 26.44 %. The findings are reported in Fig. 14b, c,
respectively. In recent years, the implied response of the unemployment rate is much
more pronounced and lasts longer, about 14 quarter vis-à-vis 12 quarters in the first
part of the sample (see Fig. 14b, c).
The contribution of the inflow rate (s) is the most important determinant of the un-
employment response in the whole sample as well as in the first sub-sample (Fig. 14a,
b). However, the contribution of the outflow rate (f ) in explaining unemployment
fluctuations becomes equally important to that of the inflow rate (s) in most recent
years (Fig. 14c). Analogous evidence is reported by Hairault et al. (2015) in the case of
France.
Fig. 13 The implied unemployment rate following and economic activity shock
Fig. 12 The implied inflow (s) and outflow (f) rate responses to an economic activity shock
Tagkalakis IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:13 Page 20 of 34
Using the implied response of the unemployment rate and the contributions of the
inflow and outflow rates (Fig. 14a–c), we construct the covariance contributions of in-
flow and outflow rates to the variance of the implied unemployment rate. The results
are reported in Table 5. The outflow rate accounts for about 47 % of the variability of
the unemployment response in the period after 2010, relative to about 16 % in the
period before 2010. When considering the whole sample, the inflow rate explains the
biggest part (66 %) of the variability of the unemployment response. These findings re-
semble to those reported in Table 1.19
6 The role of unemployment persistence
In the previous section, we examined the inflow and outflow rate responses to a nega-
tive economic activity shock, and based on these, we constructed an implied unemploy-
ment rate response. However, this implied response might not fully reflect the
persistence of actual unemployment rate. Therefore, building on the work of Barnichon
and Garda (2015), we build a parsimonious SVAR specification as the one described in
Eq. (9) and the specification (10), but we now consider only three variables: the inflow
rate (s), the outflow rate (f ), and the actual unemployment rate (u).20
We examine the impact of an exogenous increase on the inflow rate (possibly) driven
by adverse business cycle developments. Results are presented in Fig. 15a–c. The solid
black line represents the response of the variable of interest to the exogenous shock on
inflow rate (s) and the two round-dotted black lines are the 68 % confidence bands.21
Following the exogenous shock, the transition rate s remains positive for a period of
10 quarters (Fig. 15a). The decline in the outflow rate is more pronounced but slightly
less protracted (it lasts for eight quarters) than the increase in the inflow rate (Fig. 15b).
The unemployment rate increases and remains positive for a period of 15 quarters (see
Fig. 15c) after the initial inflow rate shock. That is, five to seven quarters more than it
would have been implied by the inflow and outflow rate responses. Using the method-
ology described in the previous section and employing Eq. (11) and the sample averages
of s and f, we construct the implied response of unemployment rate based on the in-
flow and outflow rate responses shown in Fig. 15a, b. The implied unemployment rate
response is shown with a solid orange line in Fig. 15c. It is more sizeable relative to the
actual unemployment response until about the eighth quarter. Thereafter, it declines
rapidly and remains positive until the 12th quarter, whereas actual unemployment re-
mains positive for about 15 quarters. This evidence is suggestive of the high persistence
in the unemployment dynamics in Greece, which work beyond the estimated responses
of the inflow and outflow rates.
7 A first assessment of the impact of structural reforms on the inflow and the
outflow rates from unemployment: a VAR analysis
The inflow rate to and outflow rate from unemployment are affected both by cyclical
and structural factors. In Section 4, we examined the impact of the decline in economic
activity on the transition rates into and out of unemployment. In the current section,
we investigate the likely impact of the structural reforms that were undertaken in the
period under investigation on the inflow (s) and outflow (f ) rates. Some of these struc-
tural labor market reforms are reflected in the decline of the EPL index (see Fig. 2),
which measures the stringency of labor relations.
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Table 5 Covariance contributions of inflow and outflow rates to the unemployment variance
(based on the implied unemployment responses of Fig. 14a–c)
β 2005 Q2–2015 Q2 2005 Q2–2010 Q1 2010 Q2–2015 Q2
βs 0.66 0.79 0.48
βf 0.29 0.16 0.47
A The initial values of s and f are based on whole sample averages, 2005Q4-2015Q2 
B The initial values of s and f are based on sample averages from 2005Q4 to 2010Q1  
C The initial values of s and f are based on sample averages from 2010Q2 to 2015Q2 
Fig. 14 Implied unemployment rate response and contributions of the inflow (s) and outflow (f) rates. a
The initial values of s and f are based on whole sample averages, 2005 Q4–2015 Q2. b The initial values of s
and f are based on sample averages from 2005 Q4 to 2010 Q1. c The initial values of s and f are based on
sample averages from 2010 Q2 to 2015 Q2
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To this end, we estimate a parsimonious three variable VAR with 1 lag: real GDP growth
rate (Dy), inflow rate (s), outflow rate (f).22 In addition, we include three exogenous vari-
ables to control for the effect of structural reforms at various phases of the economic cycle.
These exogenous variables are constructed as follows: The impact of reforms on the
inflow (s) and outflow (f ) rates can vary depending on the state of the business cycle.
Hence, the period under investigation 2003 Q1–2015 Q2 is broken down into three
sub-periods: (a) the times of deepening economic recession, i.e., when the annual real
GDP growth rate is negative and deteriorates further from one quarter to the other,23
(b) the times of gradual recovery (or decelerating recession), i.e., when the annual real
GDP growth rate is negative but improves from one quarter to the other,24 and (c) the
times of economic expansion, i.e., when the real GDP growth rate is positive.
Figure 16 plots the annual real GDP growth rate and the quarterly change of the annual
real GDP growth rate. The economy is in a state of deepening recession when both series
have negative values. The economy is in a state of gradual recovery (or decelerating reces-
sion) when the annual real GDP growth rate is negative but its quarterly change is positive.
A Inflow rate (s) to unemployment B Outflow rate (f) from unemployment
C Actual and implied unemployment rate
Fig. 15 Impulse responses following a shock on the inflow rate (s) to unemployment (in p.p.). a Inflow rate (s) to
unemployment. b Outflow rate (f) from unemployment. c Actual and implied unemployment rate. Notes: The solid
black line represents the response of the variable of interest to shock on the inflow rate (s) to unemployment; the
two round-dotted black lines are the 68 % confidence bands. The solid orange line represents the implied
unemployment rate response constructed using Eq. (11) based on the inflow and outflow impulse responses and
the sample averages of s and f. The exogenous increase in s is modeled to be 1 percentage point. Standard errors
have been calculated by bootstrapping the residuals (1000 replications were performed)
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On the basis of the three sub-periods that we identified above, we construct three
dummy variables (the times of deepening economic recession, the times of gradual re-
covery, and the times of economic expansion); each of them takes the value of 1 for the
period of reference and 0 otherwise.
Next, we multiply these three dummy variables with the dummy variable REFORMS
(which is the inverse of EPL) that was defined in Section 4.1 and obtain three new
dummy variables that are incorporated in the VAR described above as exogenous vari-
ables.25 These three new dummy variables are displayed in Fig. 16 and can be inter-
preted as progress in structural reforms at distinct phases of the business cycle.
Therefore, the value of 0 indicates no reforms (prior to 2011 Q1, there was no change
in EPL and hence no progress in reforms), the value of 0.10 stands for the adoption of
the first reforms in the period 2011 Q1–2012 Q4, and the value of 0.11 for the
additional progress in labor market reforms during the period 2013Q1–2015Q2.
Following Lutkepohl (2005), we employ cumulative dynamic multiplier functions to
examine the effect of structural reforms. These functions measure the cumulative effect of
a unit change in each of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables of the VAR.
The cumulative dynamic multiplier functions are reported in Figs. 17, 18, and 19.26
The structural labor market reforms that are undertaken at times of deepening eco-
nomic recession increase the inflow rate to unemployment (s), while reducing the out-
flow rate from unemployment (f ) and the real GDP growth rate (see Fig. 17a–c). On
the contrary, structural reforms in the labor market at times of decelerating recession
or gradual recovery lower the inflow rate (s), while they slightly stimulate the outflow
rate (f ) and boost output growth (see Fig. 18a–c).
Structural reforms at times of economic expansion have limited effects on the labor
market. After a period of 20 quarter, there is a small decline in the inflow rate (s) to un-
employment, while the outflow rate (f ) to unemployment remains practically un-
changed and the real GDP growth rate responds positively (Fig. 19a–c).
Overall, the results suggest that the structural reforms that were undertaken in times of
deep economic recession propagated the increase in the inflow rate to unemployment (s),
Fig. 16 Annual real GDP growth rate, quarterly change of the annual real GDP growth rate, and reform
implementation at various phases of the business cycle
Tagkalakis IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:13 Page 24 of 34
while the structural reforms that were undertaken in times of decelerating economic re-
cession or gradual recovery had a slight positive effect on the outflow rate.
A word of caution is needed here. The abovementioned finding should be considered to
be preliminary and constitute a first assessment of the impact of structural reforms that
were implemented in recent years. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the con-
structed dummy variables do not fully capture the variety of policy interventions that took
place in recent years, for example, the reduction of severance payments and the shorten-
ing in the notice time for dismissals, the cuts in employers’ and employees’ social security
contributions, the decline in the minimum wage, the changes in the national and sectoral
collective agreements and the primacy given to firm level agreements, the pension reform,
and the structural reforms in the product and service markets.27
8 Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of unemployment dynamics in Greece using
Labor Force Survey data from 2000 Q1 to 2015 Q2. Following earlier studies such as
Smith (2011) and Petrogolo and Pissarides (2008), we show that the inflow rate to un-
employment accounts for the biggest part of unemployment variability over the whole
sample period. However, focusing on the most recent crisis years, we found evidence
pointing to the opposite direction, i.e., that the outflow rate from unemployment is the
most important determinant of the variance of unemployment.
A Inflow rate (s) to unemployment B Outflow rate (f) from unemployment
C Output growth
Fig. 17 Cumulative responses to reforms undertaken at times of deepening economic recession. a Inflow
rate (s) to unemployment. b Outflow rate (f) from unemployment. c Output growth. Notes: The cumulative
dynamic multiplier function measures the cumulative response of the variable of interest to a unit change
in the reforms undertaken at times of deepening economic recession. Standard errors have been calculated
by bootstrapping the residuals (1000 replications were performed)
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These developments reflect the fact that early in the crisis (the period until the mid
of 2012), there was an acceleration of the total inflow rate (s) to unemployment. This is
primarily due to the increase in the job separation rate (λEU). However, it also reflects a
rise in the transition from employment to unemployment via inactivity (Ε→ Ι→U).
These results, which led into rapidly rising unemployment, were driven by the eco-
nomic recession and the structural reforms (implemented from 2010 onwards) which
eased the strictness of labor market regulation. In addition, the reduction in hiring and
the posted job vacancies on account of the recession exerted a negative effect on the
total outflow rate (f ) from unemployment, which in turn contributed further to the
rapid rise of the unemployment rate. The increase in the total outflow rate was primar-
ily due to the job finding rate (λUE), while the transition from unemployment to em-
ployment via inactivity (U→ Ι→ E) had a limited effect.
From mid-2012 onwards, uncertainty receded and economic conditions normalized.
As a consequence, both inflow and outflow rates improved. In addition, the structural
reforms that were initiated since then, i.e., the reduction in social security contribu-
tions, the activation of various targeted training and internship labor market programs,
the changes in the determination of minimum wages, the primacy given in firm level
agreements which could set wages below those in the national collective agreement,
etc., facilitated the reduction in labor costs and coupled with the gradually improving
A Inflow rate (s) to unemployment B Outflow rate (f) to unemployment
C Output growth
Fig. 18 Cumulative responses to reforms undertaken at times of gradual recovery. a Inflow rate (s) to
unemployment. b Outflow rate (f) to unemployment. c Output growth. Notes: The cumulative dynamic
multiplier function measures the cumulative response of the variable of interest to a unit change in the
reforms undertaken at times of gradual recovery. Standard errors have been calculated by bootstrapping
the residuals (1000 replications were performed)
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economic conditions contributed to the decline in the inflow rate to and the increase
in the outflow rate from unemployment. The latest movements were driven mainly by
the decline in the job separation rate (λEU) and the increase job finding (λUE) rate.
Impulse response functions (based on a SVAR specification) provide econometric evi-
dence for the negative effects of the economic recession on the unemployment dynam-
ics. Cumulative dynamic multiplier functions (from a VAR model) suggest that
structural reforms at times of deepening recession can aggravate the unemployment
problem by raising the inflow and lowering the outflow rate, while structural reforms
undertaken at times of gradual recovery or decelerating recession can be associated
with an increase in the outflow and a decline in the inflow rate.
Overall, at times of declining economic activity, the inflow rate to unemployment is
the most important determinant of unemployment developments, while at times of
economic recovery, it is the outflow rate from unemployment that matters the most.
Nevertheless, the SVAR analysis conducted has shown that the negative effects of eco-
nomic recession on the outflow from unemployment are slightly more protracted com-
pared to those on the inflow rate. This would lead to a delayed response of the
unemployment rate at times of economic recovery. Hence, economic recovery without
job creation (jobless growth) could result in persistently high unemployment rate.
Building on the analysis of Bonthuis et al. (2013), we verify the presence of an
inverse relationship between unemployment and vacancies in Greece. This inverse
A Inflow rate (s) to unemployment B Outflow rate (f) to unemployment
C Output growth
Fig. 19 Cumulative responses to reforms undertaken at times of economic expansion. a Inflow rate (s) to
unemployment. b Outflow rate (f) to unemployment. c Output growth. Notes: The cumulative dynamic
multiplier function measures the cumulative response of the variable of interest to a unit change in the
reforms undertaken at times of economic expansion. Standard errors have been calculated by
bootstrapping the residuals (1000 replications were performed)
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relationship is attributed to economic developments after 2008, the time that
Greece dipped into recession. The decline in economic activity alongside with a
more flexible labor market contributed to an increase in unemployment, i.e., an
outward shift in the Beveridge curve. Nevertheless, there is some evidence suggest-
ing that the responsiveness of unemployment to vacancy developments has in-
creased on account of structural reforms, which can lead to an improvement in
the efficiency of the matching process.
Data from 2014 onwards are suggestive of a slight outward shift in the Beveridge curve
despite the small decline in unemployment (vis-à-vis its high levels recorded in 2013).
The large structural changes and the sectoral reallocation of economic activity on account
of the recent crisis have created increased (skill, sectoral, locational) mismatches between
unemployed and posted vacancies leading to very high structural unemployment, despite
the beneficial effect of labor market reforms on matching efficiency.
Overall, the analysis implies that policy interventions are required on two fronts.
First, there is a need to enhance job creation. Second, it is necessary to improve the re-
employment chances of the unemployed.
Job creation goes hand-in-hand with new domestic and foreign private investment,
which in turn requires a business friendly institutional and tax environment. This could
be promoted through the following policy actions: adoption of structural reforms in
product and services markers, improved public sector efficiency, stable tax system, and
the normalization of the financing and liquidity conditions in the Greek economy,
through the loosening and subsequent abolishment of capital controls.
Last but not least, given the structural mismatch between job vacancies and available
workers, it is of utmost importance to promote active labor market policies, retraining,
and education in order to improve the skills and the re-employment probability of the
long-term unemployed.
Endnotes
1The LFS survey is conducted by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (El.Stat.) and con-
cerns about 25,000–30,000 households in each quarter (i.e., about 65,000–80,000 indi-
viduals). See Daouli et al. 2015 for information on additional survey characteristics.
2The survey data on the recall question suffer from both classification error (the re-
spondents might consider themselves unemployed, while the statistical authority classi-
fies them as employed or inactive) and recall error (the respondents might not be able
to correctly recall their last year labor market status). Nevertheless, the correlation be-
tween actual unemployment and the implied unemployment based on the recall ques-
tion is very high (98.1 %).
3The deep recession in the early years of the crisis is also related to the fact that the first
Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece paid particular emphasis on the correction
of fiscal imbalances. According to the IMF (2015), the primary balance as a percent of
GDP improved from −10.3 % in 2009 to −3.0 % in 2011. Subsequently, it still improved but
by much less, i.e., it was −1.4 % in 2012, 1.0 % in 2013, and 0.0 % in 2014. Hence, the big-
gest part of the fiscal consolidation effort (with devastating effects on output growth) took
place in 2010–2011. The same picture emerges if we consider the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary balance as a percent of potential GDP, i.e., from −13.2 % in 2009 it was reduced to
−1.6 % in 2011 and improved further to 1.8 % in 2012, 4.6 % in 2013, and 3.2 % in 2014.
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4According to Hairault et al. (2015), the outflow rate to unemployment is the domin-
ant factor to explain the unemployment dynamics in France the period from 2004 to
2010.
5The analysis up till now was based on the notion of steady state unemployment.
However, as pointed out by Smith (2011) and Elsby et al. (2013), actual unemploy-
ment can diverge from steady state unemployment in times of rapidly changing un-
employment as is the case in Greece during the recent crisis years. The correlation
between the actual and the steady state unemployment is 90.4 % in Greece. Fol-
lowing Smith (2011), we calculated rolling 4-year covariance contributions of the
inflow and outflow rates to the variance of actual unemployment. The findings
support the conclusions based on the steady state unemployment, i.e., in the early
years of the crisis, the inflow rate to unemployment (s) accounted for the biggest
part of unemployment movements. However, in the latter years of the crisis, the
outflow rate from unemployment (f ) had the primary role in explaining the vari-
ability of unemployment.
6Job vacancy rate = posted vacancies/(posted vacancies + occupied posts).
7The high vacancy rates in 2004–2005 relate to the economic expansion associated
also with the 2004 Olympic Games. In order to control for seasonality, the values re-
ported for both the job vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are averages over four
quarters, i.e., the observation for 2004 Q4 is the average of 2004 Q1–2004 Q4.
8The data were seasonally adjusted by means of ARIMA X12-program.
9OLS regressions with standard errors corrected with the Newey-West procedure.
10For stability, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable should be strictly less
than unity.
11The OECD EPL index runs until 2013. The dummy variable REFORM takes the
value of 3 from 2013 Q1 to 2015 Q2 assuming that the EPL index will remain at its
2013 level for the coming years (from 2014 up until mid-2015). This assumption re-
flects the fact that no further reforms have been implemented regarding the conditions
for hiring and firing as well as that none of the previous reforms was undone in recent
years (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD 2016).
12The same picture emerges from Figs. 7–10; one should just reverse the Y and X
axis, placing the unemployment rate on the Y axis and the job vacancy rate on the X
axis.
13As discussed before, given that the job vacancy data collection started in early 2004,
the first observations might be affected by various errors—to address these concerns,
we rely on a slightly smaller sample 2005 Q4–2015 Q2.
14The EU-IMF financed Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was initiated
in May 2010 (see Tagkalakis, 2013).
15The lag length was chosen based on the information provided by relevant lag-
length selection criteria (LR test and Akaike information criterion), LM test on no
autocorrelation, and the need to work with a parsimonious specification in view of
the small sample size (see Tables A.1–A.2). The VAR satisfies the stability condi-
tions (Table A.3).
16The exogenous decline in output growth is modeled to be one percentage point.
Standard errors have been calculated by bootstrapping the residuals (1000 replications
were performed).
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17I would like to thank one of the referees for making this useful suggestion.
18The implied responses in Fig. 14a are the unemployment responses in Fig. 13 after
subtracting the initial starting value u = 13.70 %.
19We have repeated the above exercise, i.e., we estimated a 2-lag SVAR after replacing
the yearly GDP growth rate with quarterly GDP growth rate to avoid potential autocorrel-
ation issues. The impulse responses are shown in Figure A1 (see Appendix), the implied
unemployment responses for the three scenarios regarding s and f are shown in Figure A2
(see Appendix), and the constructed covariance contributions are shown in Table A4 (see
Appendix). Overall, the results are qualitatively similar; the only noticeable difference is
that the implied unemployment responses are more sizeable and protracted.
20We consider a one lag SVAR which also includes the EAP dummy and a constant
term. The sample size is 2003 Q1–2015 Q2 (in the previous section, we had also incor-
porated job vacancies—that is why we started in 2005 Q4). The lag length was chosen
based on the information provided by relevant lag-length criteria, LM test on no auto-
correlation, and the need to work with a parsimonious specification in view of the small
sample size (see Appendix, Tables A.5–A.7).
21The exogenous increase in s is modeled to be one percentage point. Standard errors
have been calculated by bootstrapping the residuals (1000 replications were performed).
22The lag length was chosen based on the information provided by relevant lag-
length criteria, LM test on no autocorrelation, and the need to work with a parsimoni-
ous specification in view of the small sample size (see Appendix, Tables A.7–A.10).
23In more detail: Dyt = yt – yt − 4 < 0 and Dyt −Dyt − 1 = (yt − yt − 4) − (yt − 1 − yt − 5) < 0.
24In more detail: Dyt = yt − yt − 4 < 0 and Dyt −Dyt − 1 = (yt − yt − 4) − (yt − 1 − yt − 5) > 0.
25As can be seen in Fig. 2, reforms that reduced the EPL index were initiated only in the
period from 2011 Q1 onwards. Before that time, the EPL index was not changed at all.
Given that we want to focus only on reform implementation, i.e., the change in the EPL
index, we subtract from the constructed series REFORMS (= 1/EPL) its value that corre-
sponds to the pre-2011 Q1 period. Hence, the variable employed actually shows the incre-
mental improvement in reform implementation (or the incremental change in EPL
index). During non-reform periods, the variable REFORMS will take the value of 0.
26Standard errors have been calculated by bootstrapping the residuals (1000 replica-
tions were performed).
27On account of product market reforms, the product market regulation (PMR) index
of the OECD for Greece declined from a value of 2.21 in 2008 to 1.74 in 2013
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD 2016).
Appendix
Table 6 Lag selection criteria
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 490.725 2.6e-16 −24.55 −24.3664 −24.0382
1 573.496 165.54 16 0.000 8.5e-18 −27.9742 −27.5456* −26.7798*
2 592.331 37.671* 16 0.002 7.7e-18* −28.1196* −27.4462 −26.2427
3 600.304 15.945 16 0.457 1.3e-17 −27.7079 −26.7896 −25.1486
"Note: The chosen specification is the one with 2 lags (based on LR, FPE, AIC - test value indicated in italics). A "*" points
to the lag selected by each test"
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Table 7 Lagrange multiplier test
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2
1 23.6374 16 0.09773
2 13.4864 16 0.63692
Ho : no autocorrelation at lag order
Table 8 Eigenvalue stability condition
Eigenvalue Modulus
0.8977185 + 0.2552436i 0.933299
0.8977185 − 0.2552436i 0.933299
0.5252072 + 0.2808765i 0.595596
0.5252072 − 0.2808765i 0.595596
−0.5355586 0.535559
−0.3401789 0.340179
−0.051685 + 0.3233111i 0.327416
−0.051685 − 0.3233111i 0.327416
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability conditions
A B
C D
Fig. 20 Impulse responses to a negative economic activity shock (in p.p.). a The response of quarterly GDP
growth rate. b The response of inflow rate (s) to unemployment. c The response of outflow rate (f) from
unemployment. d The response of the job vacancy rate. Notes: The solid black line represents the response
of the variable of interest to the exogenous negative shock on quarterly output growth; the two round-dotted
black lines are the 68 % confidence bands. The exogenous decline in quarterly output growth is modeled to be
1 percentage point (p.p). Standard errors have been calculated by bootstrapping the residuals (1000
replications were performed)
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Table 9 Covariance contributions of inflow and outflow rates to the unemployment variance
(based on the implied unemployment responses of Fig. 21)
β 2005 Q2–2015 Q2 2005 Q2–2010 Q1 2010 Q2–2015 Q2
βs 0.64 0.77 0.45
βf 0.30 0.17 0.49
Table 10 Lag selection criteria (unemployment persistence SVAR)
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 410.136 2.2e-11 −16.0454 −159.144 −15.7013
1 575.15 330.03* 9 0.000 4.2e-14* −22.286* −22.0239* −21.5977*
2 579.368 84.373 9 0.491 5.2e-14 −22.0947 −21.7016 −21.0622
3 581.008 32.793 9 0.952 7.0e-14 −21.8003 −21.2761 −20.4237
4 583.498 49.801 9 0.836 9.4e-14 −21.5399 −20.8846 −19.8191
"Note: The chosen specification is the one with 1 lags, see LR, FPE, AIC, HQIC, SBIC test (a "*" points to the lag selected by
each test)"
Table 11 Lagrange multiplier test (unemployment persistence SVAR)
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2
1 80.945 9 0.52465
2 27.440 9 0.97359
Table 12 Eigenvalue stability condition (unemployment persistence SVAR)
Eigenvalue Modulus
0.8900651 + 0.1704689i 0.906243
0.8900651 − 0.1704689i 0.906243
0.7216574 0.721657
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability conditions
Table 13 Lag selection criteria (structural reforms VAR)
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 385.612 6.5e-11 −14.9445 −14.7697 −14.4856
1 479.323 187.42 9 0.000 2.2e-12* −18.3329* −18.0271* −17.5299*
2 485.01 11.375 9 0.251 2.5e-12 −18.2004 −17.7635 −17.0532
3 488.842 76.631 9 0.568 3.2e-12 −17.9937 −17.4257 −16.5023
4 499.786 21.889* 9 0.009 3.1e-12 −18.0714 −17.3725 −16.2359
"Note: The chosen specification is the one with 1 lags, see LR, FPE, AIC, HQIC, SBIC test (a "*" points to the lag selected by
each test)"
Table 14 Lagrange multiplier test (structural reforms VAR)
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2
1 96.152 9 0.38253
2 71.813 9 0.61825
Ho : no autocorrelation at lag order
Table 15 Eigenvalue stability condition (structural reforms VAR)
Eigenvalue Modulus
0.9293062 + 0.03336861i 0.929905
0.9293062 − 0.03336861i 0.929905
0.6784126 0.678413
All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability conditions
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Fig. 21 Implied unemployment rate response and contributions of the inflow (s) and outflow (f) rates. a
The initial values of s and f are based on whole sample averages, 2005 Q4–2015 Q2. b The initial values of s
and f are based on sample averages from 2005 Q4–2010 Q1. c The initial values of s and f are based on
sample averages from 2010 Q2–2015 Q2
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